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Abstract
As it is well known, classical mechanics consists of several basic
features like determinism, reductionism, completeness of knowledge
and mechanicism. In this article the basic assumptions are discussed
which underlie those features. It is shown that these basic assump-
tions — though universally assumed up the beginnings of the XX
century — are far from being obvious. Finally it is shown that —
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to a certain extent — there is nothing wrong in assuming these basic
postulates. Rather, the error lies in the epistemological absolutization
of the theory, which was considered as a mirroring of Nature.
Keywords: Perfect determination, determinism, mechanicism,
completeness, mirroring, causality.
1 Introduction
Classical mechanics (CM) is one of the greatest achievements of human
knowledge. It is a compact building whose conceptual and mathematical as-
pects have been known and studied in all details and consequences, though
the formation of the theory itself was a difficult process which took three
centuries (XVII-XIX) to be completely achieved.
But, to the best of my knowledge, some basic — and sometimes only
implicitly assumed — postulates of CM have not been subjected to critical
examination — a state of affairs which can be partly explained by the im-
plicit character of some of them. This situation, on the other hand, has as a
consequence that all basic postulates of the theory have not been considered
in their connection as a system — contrarily to what happens for the formal-
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ism of the theory, which from the beginning of XIX century is presented in
a systematic form. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, there is until today
no handbook which introduces these postulates in systematic order at the
beginning of the exposition1.
Such an enterprise is possible today because quantum mechanics has
shown, especially in the last twenty years, that several assumptions of CM are
far away from being above a legitimate suspicion or a critical examination.
I will try to expose in a systematic form these assumptions. In section 2, I
shall examine CM’s determinism and the postulates from which it stems. In
section 3 a similar analysis is devoted to reductionism, while section 4 shows
that mechanicism is equivalent to determinism plus reductionism. Section
5 examines the postulate of the completeness of knowledge (and not of the
completeness of the theory itself, a problem which today cannot be posed
in this form). Sections 6–8 are devoted to the more general consequences of
these assumptions while in section 9 some concluding remarks will follow.
1See [LANDAU/LIFSHITZ 1976a] [GOLDSTEIN 1950] [HESTENES 1986]
[KNUDSEN/HJORTH 1995] for instance.
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2 Determinism
Everybody admits that CM is deterministic. But determinism is a more com-
plex assumption which supposes other, more basic postulates or principles.
2.1 Omnimoda determinatio
The most basic assumption of CM is the postulate of perfect determination
which may be expressed as follows: all properties of a physical system are
perfectly determined, where a physical system can be roughly understood
as an object or a collection of objects (somehow interrelated) which can be
(directly or indirectly) experienced, and a property as the value which can
be assigned to a physical variable or observable. Perfectly determined means
that each variable of the system has at all times a definite value.
This assumption was always implicitly made. For all ‘classical’ physicists
it was so self-evident that it was even not worth of mention. In fact modern
physicists — like Galilei, Newton, and many others — inherited such assump-
tion from all past philosophy: Democritus, Plato, Aristotle, the middle-age
philosophers until the modernity never thought differently but all assumed
that all properties of being are determined (the problem was obviously to
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determine what the main or true being is). In fact Kant says: all what exists
is completely determined [KANT 1763, 85] [KANT 1787, B 599–602], which
means that, between every possible predicate of an object and its negation,
one of the pair must be actualized. Since every physical property can be
reduced in a binary form (i.e. using what in quantum mechanics are called
projectors) — for example ‘moving at the speed of light’ or ‘not moving at
the speed of light’ (in some space–time context and by reference to a system,
both to be specified) —, then the philosophical definition is a generaliza-
tion of the physical one and, so far as physical objects are considered, they
can been taken to be equivalent. For this examination Kant is an especially
interesting example because it has been often told that his philosophy is
strictly related with Newtonian mechanics. The latin traditional expression
for the complete determination is omnimoda determinatio and can be found
for example in [BAUMGARTEN 1739, par. 148].2
Now it turns out that quantum mechanics violates the omnimoda deter-
minatio at least through the superposition principle3: In fact if a quantum
2On the problem see also Leibniz’s letter to de Volder of april 1702 in [LEIBNIZ PS,
239].
3For argumentation of this point see chapters 24, 30 and 46 of [AULETTA 2000].
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system can be in a superposition state, say of wave localized in an arbitrary
region 1 and of another in an arbitrary but different region 2, then, following
Kant, it is certainly impossible to say ‘either it is in the region 1 or it is
not’ or ‘either it is in the region 2 or it is not’, or, more simply, ‘either it
is in the region 1 or it is in the region 2’, i.e. quantum mechanics does not
acknowledges a generalized exclusion disjunction4. There are no means to
reduce such an indetermination to subjective ignorance, so that it must be
taken as an ontologically basic feature of the theory.
2.2 Continuity
The omnimoda determinatio may be easily confused with determinism. But
they are not equivalent: In fact one can conceive a ‘classical’ world where
every ‘state of the world’ (roughly: the complex of all states of all systems
within at a given instant) is in itself perfectly determined though without
relationship with past and future states, in the sense that the world can
jump from a state to another randomly. If this would be the case, nobody
could speak of a deterministic evolution (for a more formal definition of
4On this specific point see [HARDEGREE 1979].
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determinism see next subsection).
Therefore, in order to obtain determinism we also need continuity. This
assumption is known as the principle of continuity and it states that the
variables associated to a physical system are supposed to be continuous,
which in physics means that, given two arbitrary values of a physical variable,
all intermediate possible real values are also allowed.
The principle of continuity, though often not explicitly stated in hand-
books, was widely used already from the early days of CM: one may remember
here, for example, the use of the principle made by Galilei by the law of fall5.
Obviously the point of major conflict between CM and quantum mechan-
ics was continuity, which is rejected by the quantum postulate (the values
of quantum observables can be discontinuous) and by the fact that quantum
systems can jump6.
5See [MACH 1883, 130–131, 181] [MACH 1905, 223].
6The quantum postulate was assumed by Planck [PLANCK 1900a, PLANCK 1900b]
and generalized by Bohr [BOHR 1913]. About the formalism of quantum jumps see
[CARMICHAEL 1993].
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2.3 Determinism
Sufficient and necessary conditions of determinism are the postulate of per-
fect determination and the principle of continuity. In fact, given the perfect
determination of the state of a system at an arbitrary initial state, if its
dynamic variables (for example the energy) are continuous, then also ev-
ery future state of the system will be perfectly determined and unique, i.e.
without alternatives or without branching7. As it is known, a mathematical
formulation of this assumption is given by Hamilton’s canonical equations,
which in terms of Poisson brackets can be written
q˙ = {H, q}, p˙ = {H, p}. (1)
The Hamiltonian H , the energy function of the system, fully describes the
system and all its future (and past) evolution, and it is expressed in terms of
the position q and the momentum p. Note, however, that determinism is not
the same as predictability: in fact it is well known that, for a large class of
problems, almost identical initial conditions can have very different solutions
7One may think at Laplace’s dictum that nothing is uncertain: see [CASSIRER 1957,
134–35] [EARMAN 1986, 7]. The latter book represent a good analysis of classical
determinism.
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for later times [see also subsection 3.2].
Determinism too is an ancient philosophical concept, introduced probably
by ancient atomism and further developed by ancient stoicism.
In quantum mechanics the Schro¨dinger equation is also deterministic, but
here what evolves deterministically is an amplitude, i.e. it is — paradoxically
— a determinism which is intrinsically probabilistic. In fact, in the general
case, we cannot foresee what values the observables will have; we can only
write their probability distributions. As we have already said, the break of
continuity is a major feature of quantum mechanics. For this reason Bohr
[BOHR 1928] [BOHR 1929] spoke of a break of determinism and of causality
as such. Causality may be here understood in a strict and in a wide sense,
following the distinction between determinism and predictability. In fact, in
a strict sense it may be taken as equivalent to determinism. In a wide sense
it may be understood as predictability, and then it should be rather taken as
equivalent to mechanicism [see section 4] to the extent in which also linearity
and separability are necessary in order to have a predictable future.
One could think that, behind perfect determination and continuity, de-
terminism also supposes conservation laws. We may understand the problem
of conservation in two forms:
9
i) nothing which is physical can disappear;
ii) in an isolated system certain physical quantities such as the angular mo-
mentum are conserved.
On the second point we shall return later [see subsection 5.1]. Point i) is
a general statement about the conservation of energy (which obviously is
a conserved quantity also in the second sense). In fact energy is the basic
physical quantity which, following our physics, can be transformed but never
destroyed, a fact that is expressed in a general form by Einstein’s equation
E = mc2, (2)
which is valid also in the case of annihilation of particle–antiparticle pairs
(in fact, as it is known, their mass is transformed in the energy of ‘outgoing’
photons).
In the statement i) it is the universe as a whole which is considered as
a closed system. It is evident that this statement is a more basic one —
but also a weaker one — than statement ii). In fact, we could think a
world where there can be no strict conservation of the energy in the sense
of statement ii) and notwithstanding would be deterministic. For instance,
there could be an universal but unknown and unknowable ‘ether’ such that
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all observable physical system lose part of their energy. Then the energy
would be conserved in the sense of statement i) because a form of energy is
transformed in another form by the action of ether, but it is not conserved
in the sense of statement ii) because, for example, we could have a a physical
law of this form:
p˙ = F − αp, (3)
where F is the force and α some parameter. Obviously the ‘path’ or the
‘trajectory’ of the every physical system should be always calculable, i.e. the
loss of energy should follow strict laws and not be random. Otherwise the
world could be not deterministic. On the other hand, as we have said, even
if the ‘physics’ in this universe should be expressed in terms of equations
like (3), the ether is not something which is outside of such an universe, so
that, in a certain objective (or meta–physical) sense (God’s point of view?),
proposition i) is satisfied. But the difficulty of this position is to admit the
existence of something physical which in principle cannot be experienced.
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3 Reductionism
Reductionism, as we shall see in that what follows, is another basic piece of
CM and, as determinism, it supposes other assumptions which need to be
preliminarily examined.
3.1 Materialism
One may wonder that the assumption of materialism is basic for CM since
one may think that it is a metaphysical assumption without consequence or
relevance upon a physical science as CM is. But this is not the case: CM is
a mechanics, i.e. a theory of the motion of bodies and of the forces which
act upon them. And a body is necessarily a material entity.
In fact the existence and the basic properties of matter were assumed and
defined from the beginnings already by Galilei8 and by Newton. In the third
regula philosophandi of book III of the Principia [NEWTON 1687, 552–55],
Newton makes a catalogue of properties of matter (bodies): Extension (a
cartesian property), hardness, impenetrability, capacity to move, inertia9.
8See [CASSIRER 1906, II, 387–89]. See also [MACH 1883, 248–49] [HALL 1954, 106–
107].
9See [KOYRE´ 1957, ch. 7] for commentary.
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About hardness, in [NEWTON 1704, 388–92] it is explained that the parts
of all homogeneous hard bodies which fully touch one another stick together
very strongly. From their cohesion Newton inferred that particles attract one
another by some force, which in immediate contact is exceedingly strong.
On the other hand all bodies seem to be composed of hard particles; for
otherwise fluids, as water, would not freeze, or fluids as “spirit of nitre and
mercury” would not become hard “by dissolving the mercury and evaporating
the flegma”. And therefore hardness can be reckoned as the property of all
uncompounded matter. So far Newton. It is then evident that all fluids
can be reduced to hard bodies by freezing or evaporating: In this case the
particles cohere fully, which in turn means that some bodies are not hard
only because they are to a certain extent rarefied, i.e. there is some vacuum
between the particles10. In other words, following Newton, all matter can be
reduced to some ground ‘state’ in which it is fully homogeneous and hence
inelastic. In fact elasticity is possible only if there is some internal structure
to the matter, which is excluded by the postulated homogeneity.
One may discuss — and Newton himself had no final position about11 —
10An important difference with respect to Descartes [KOYRE´ 1968, 33–34, 1205–110].
11See the mentioned regula III.
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if matter is a continuous medium divisible in infinitum or it is composed by
elementary corpuscles which are strongly bound and fixed together by ad-
hering to each other. However, the consequence is that, by full homogeneity
and/or rigidity, in case of collision of two bodies moving at the same speed
from opposite directions, they will coalesce at the point of collision (because
fully inelastic).12 One may say that the kinetic energy has been transformed
in some activity of the particles composing the body, but precisely this is
impossible because there is no internal structure and no possibility of the
particles to translate, to rotate or vibrate relatively to one another13. In
a general way note that Newton had not included the force as an intrinsic
property of matter as such — i.e. forces can only act ‘from outside’ upon
the matter. In fact Newton only attributes a vis inertiæ to the matter and
says [NEWTON 1704, 397–98] that it “is a passive principle by which bodies
persist in their motion or rest, receive motion in proportion to the force im-
pressing it, and resist as much as they are resisted. By this principle alone
there never could have been any motion in the world. Some other principle
was necessary for putting bodies into motion; and now they are in motion,
12For examination see [KOYRE´ 1957, ch. 9].
13For all the problem of bodies’ collision see [MACH 1883, 310–31].
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some other principle is necessary for conserving the motion. For from the
various composition of two motions, ’tis very certain that there is not always
the same quantity of motion in the world. [. . . ] it appears that motion may
be got or lost. But by reason of the tenacity of the fluids, and attrition of
their parts, and the weakness of elasticity in solids, motion is much more
apt to be lost than got, and is always upon the decay. For bodies which
are either absolutely hard, or so oft as to be void of elasticity, will not re-
bound from one other. Impenetrability makes them only stop. If two equal
bodies meet directly in vacuo, they will by the laws of motion stop where
they meet, and lose all their motion, and remain in rest, unless they be
elastic, and receive new motion from their spring.” Therefore Newton con-
cludes [NEWTON 1704, 401–402] that it seems to him that “these particles
[of matter] have not only a vis inertiæ . . . but also that they are moved by
certain active principles, such as is that of gravity, and that which causes
fermentation, and the cohesion of bodies.” As it is clear in the following
pages of the Optics and in other places, these principles are due to the direct
action of God. Therefore, one can understand that Leibniz, in his letter to
the princess of Wales [LEIBNIZ PS, VII, 352], defend the conservation law of
’force and energy’ against Newton. And it is interesting that, in his first an-
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swer, Clark writes [NEWTON 1704, VII, 354] that God “not only composes
or puts things together, but is himself the Author and continual Preserver of
their original forces and moving powers”.
Therefore we see that the materialism assumed since the early days of
CM is far from being obvious, and the idea of a fully homogeneous matter
was very soon abandoned. In quantum mechanics there can be no question
of perfectly hard and localized corpuscles: To quantum entities is intrin-
sic a wave-like behavior or some fuzziness. Therefore it is better to speak
of extended particles14. On the other hand properties as the hardness or
impenetrability seem inadequate to microentities as we know them now.
3.2 Linearity
Linearity is an important property of classical systems. In itself it is essen-
tially a mathematical property, because it consists in the requirement that
the basic equations of CM must be linear, i.e. reducible to a form like
a0(x)y
(n) + a1(x)y
(n−1) + . . .+ a
n
(x)y = f(x), (4)
14On this point see chapters chapters 30 and 33 of [AULETTA 2000].
16
where a0(x), a1(x), . . . , an(x) are coefficients, f(x) is some function and y
(n)
the n–th derivative of y. But linearity has a conceptual relevance to the
extent in which it excludes feed–back, i.e. self–increasing processes.
It is linearity which allows an important aspect of the ‘reductionistic
methodology’ of CM: the factorization between component ‘elements’ of a
system, for example the decomposition of motion in components by Galilei,
the decomposition of forces by Newton or the decomposition of harmonic
components15. In other words if the cause (the force) C1 produces the effect
(the acceleration) E1 and the cause (the force) C2 the effect (the acceleration)
E2, then C1 + C2 produces E1 + E2. This principle is often called principle
of (classical) superposition.
One could think that in CM a small perturbation on a given system or the
weak interaction of this with another system only causes a small deviation
in the trajectory of the system in the phase space, such that, normally, the
system will ‘absorb’ it and return on the ancient deterministic path. But
a perfect classical system can show such a dependence on initial condition
that its evolution can be chaotic (in fact in chaotic regime this dependence
15For these examples see [MACH 1883, 144–45, 191–92].
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is expressed by a strong divergence of initial very close, indistinguishable
trajectories in phase space). Note that, in the chaos theory, chaos itself is
intrinsic and deterministic and not stochastic and extrinsic — in other words
it is not due to random fluctuations of the environment or to noise16. In fact
there can be chaos also by Hamiltonian systems.
Linearity is not violated by quantum mechanics. In fact Schro¨dinger
equation is linear, and any attempt to introduce non–linear terms in this
equation has up to now failed17.
3.3 Separability
Separability is another key feature of CM. But it is again an implicit assump-
tion and firstly in 1935, as CM was confronted with quantum mechanics, it
16On the point see [SCHUSTER 1988] [RUELLE 1989].
17A non–linear equation for quantum mechanics
was proposed in [BIALYNICKI-B./MYCIELSKI 1976]. Shimony proposed an experiment
aiming to verify if there are non–linear terms and if they have the magnitude proposed
by Bialynicki–Birula and Mycielski [SHIMONY 1979]. A later experiment performed on
these outlines tendentially excludes such terms [SHULL et al. 1980]. Obviously this does
not mean that the methods of quantum mechanics and chaos theory cannot be combined.
They can be, and actually are unified in what is today known as ‘quantum chaos’.
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was stated explicitly by Einstein and co–workers [EINSTEIN et al. 1935].
The principle of separability may be expressed in the following way: given
two non–interacting physical systems, all their physical properties are sep-
arately determined, or, in other terms, the result of a measurement on one
system cannot depend on a measurement performed on the other system.
The meaning of the principle is the following: two systems can be inter-
dependent only through a physical interaction (for example some form of
potential energy).
Again quantum mechanics violates the separability principle by a con-
sequence of the superposition principle for multiparticle systems: entangle-
ment. In fact for entangled subsystems, it is not possible to factorize the
probabilities of the outcomes of experiments performed on each subsystem
locally. In other words, probabilities calculated on one of two ‘distant’ sub-
systems, even if they do not physically interact, are not independent18.
18There exists a wide literature on this subject. For a summary see chapters 31 and
34–35 of [AULETTA 2000].
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3.4 Reductionism
Now we may summarize the results of this section by saying that material-
ism plus linearity plus separability are sufficient and necessary conditions of
reductionism. Roughly speaking, by reductionism it is usually meant that
a system is given as the “sum” of its constituent components, or, equiva-
lently, that any system can be divided into “elementary” parts. The aim of
reductionism is then to find the ultimate elements of matter which cannot be
further reduced. To our knowledge there is no certainty (and even doubts)
that such a task will ever be accomplished. One speaks today, for example,
of quarks and leptons as ‘divisible’ particles. However, quantum mechanics
violates this type of reductionism because it violates the separability prin-
ciple — and does not, as we have seen, violates linearity (leaving aside the
problem of materialism). In fact it is evident that, if separability is violated,
no reduction of a whole to ‘parts’ is possible because the parts could be not
treated as independent systems.
On the other hand, reductionism can be also understood as the reduction
of more complex theories and sciences as chemistry and biology to physics
and especially to quantum mechanics (this may be called epistemological or
20
methodological reductionism relatively to the first type, which may be called
ontological reductionism). It is true that quantum mechanics shows its effects
(entanglement, for example) also at mesoscopic level. But this means anyway
that the mesoscopic or the macroscopic world are only ‘illusions’, apparent
realities. In fact the process of decoherence and especially of localization
which goes together with decoherence, especially when the number and the
complexity of systems grows, is throughout objective19. On the other hand,
no necessity arises to conceive of methodological reductionism as a one–way
operation: If one speaks of reduction to more elementary objects, one should
speak — with more reason — of a methodological reduction of microscopic
equations for the constituents of a system (via coarse graining) to differential
equations for macroscopic variables, and from these (via numerical calcula-
tions of Poincare´ sections) to low dimensional Poincare´ maps20.
19See chapters 17 and 24–25 of [AULETTA 2000].
20See [SCHUSTER 1988, 14–16] [BERGE´ et al. 1984, 63–78].
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4 Mechanicism
Sufficient and necessary conditions of mechanicism are determinism and re-
ductionism. No ‘classical’ mechanics can violate the one or the other. In facts
mechanicism consists in the theory that, given an input (some force) we have
a fully automatic and proportional output (some acceleration), which would
be surely impossible if the whole system were more than the sum of the
‘parts’ (i.e. if the requirement of reductionism would be violated), or if it
would show a random reaction to a given action (i.e. if the requirement of
determinism would be violated). On the other hand, a system satisfying the
features of determinism and reductionism would be necessarily mechanic. In
fact we distinguish the behavior of organic life from a pure mechanical be-
havior exactly through the violation of the one or of the other requirement
or of both.
5 Completeness
The possibility of a complete knowledge in CM is dependent on other as-
sumptions, namely determinism and isolability. Let us examine firstly the
assumption of isolability.
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5.1 Isolability
CM assumes that isolated systems are possible; i.e. that we can always the-
oretically treat and experimentally (at least in principle) generate a system
without physical interdependence with other systems or with the environ-
ment. It is the isolability which guarantees conservation laws of pertinent
quantities. In fact angular momentum, energy or motion can be conserved
only if the system is considered as isolated from others, i.e. there is no
interaction such as to cause dispersion or no action of an external force
such as to change its motion. Quantum mechanics does not apparently vi-
olate this assumption. But it may be asked if there are actually isolated
quantum–mechanical systems and even more if macroscopic systems can be
fully isolated.
5.2 Completeness
In CM it is supposed that one can perfectly know (at least in principle)
all properties of a given system. In other words the properties of the ob-
ject system can be perfectly measured. Therefore it is postulated that the
measurement errors can be — at least in principle — always reduced below
23
an arbitrarily small quantity ǫ. Hence this assumption may be called the
postulate of reduction to zero of the measurement error.
Note that this postulate is not a direct consequence of the principle of
perfect determination only, because it can be the case that a system is ob-
jectively but not subjectively perfectly determined. It supposes continuity
too: in fact if the pertinent variables were discontinuous, then we could not
approximate to a point-like value in a given interval. Hence it presupposes
determinism (which, as we know, is equivalent to perfect determination plus
continuity). But isolability too: In fact if the system could never be really
isolated, we could never know its properties perfectly, even not in a very large
time interval, because, during the flow of time, it may be that small inter-
actions with external systems cause small uncertainties in the measurement
results so that — even if these uncertainties do not cumulate — one cannot
go beyond a certain threshold.
If we speak of the perfect knowledge of all properties of a given system
at the same time, then this assumption is obviously violated in quantum
mechanics through the uncertainty principle. In fact this principle states
that, by increasing the knowledge or the determination of an observable of a
conjugate pair, the complementary observable must proportionally increase
24
its uncertainty.
6 Classical Mechanics
We can now draw the first general conclusion from the above analysis: CM
consists of both mechanicism and completeness (of knowledge). There is no
doubt that there can be no CM without mechanicism. But one may think
that completeness is not a necessary condition of CM. This is not the case
because CM is actually so built that a perfect transparency of the object
system to the knowledge corresponds to the perfect ontological determina-
tion of it. But it could also be not otherwise: For a physicist the primary
questions are objective and not subjective: In order to admit an incomplete
knowledge together with the assumption of mechanicism — and hence of a
perfect ontological determination —, one should know some basic limitations
of human mind, which in principle exclude the possibility for human beings of
perfectly knowing systems which are objectively perfectly determined. But
no such problems have ever been found.
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7 Classical Gnoseology
Classical mechanics has been developed together with what may be called a
classical gnoseology — i. e. the gnoseology of Galilei, Spinoza, Newton, Kant
and many others. Classical gnoseology certainly supposes the completeness
of knowledge, i.e. that the properties of being can be perfectly known. But
it also supposes what may be called a ‘mirroring’ theory. Explicitly: classical
gnoseology considers the act of knowledge as a mirroring of the properties of
the object.
In other words, knowledge is understood as a reproduction of objective
and given data and not as a form of interaction between subject and object.
This understanding of knowledge is very ancient and can also be found by
philosophers as Plato. Several philosophy schools have shared this pointof
view. Obviously, there is no agreement between several schools about what
is the being to be reproduced (ideas as platonic substances, atoms, forms,
material objects, and so on). When knowledge is so understod, then one
assigns to the subject a mere reproductive and representative role.
However this view is no so evident. In fact pragmatism21 proposes a
21On this point see [PEIRCE 1878a, PEIRCE 1878b].
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different theory of knowledge. It is seen as a problems–solving enterprise
which, by starting with a problem, assumes a hypothesis (under many others
possible ones) because it can solve in a satisfactory manner the conflicts
or the contradictions arisen from the problem itself. This is not the place
where to examine this subject in details, but I think that this explanation of
how theories work and are generated is far more satisfactory for describing
scientific knowledge than the traditional, classical approach. I only wish to
stress following aspects of this explanation:
i) Subject and object are not understood as static beings and knowledge
not as a form of translation of data into a mind (and how would it be
possible?).
ii) Experience is dynamic and comprehends ‘subject’ and ‘object’22.
iii) Knowledge is open and never represents a final answer.
iv) Knowledge is a form of praxis and the theory is not completely separated
from other human activities.
22On this point see [DEWEY 1929].
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8 Classical Philosophy
Classical philosophy, the main stream in XVII-XVIII centuries, is compound
of CM plus classical gnoseology. That philosophers and physicists of that age
have acknowledged all or almost all the above principles can be seen from the
following examples. Let us first take Kant’s examination of the ontological
proof of the existence of God23. Kant says that when I affirm that God exists,
I add no new predicate to the concept of God; rather I pose only the subject
(God) in itself with all his predicates, i.e. the object, in relationship with my
concept. Both, the object and the concept, must contain the same. In other
words, in Kant’s terminology, what is real does not contain something more
than what is only possible (the concept). If the object should contain more
than the concept, then the latter will not express the whole object and will
therefore be not adequate to this object. So far Kant. In this argumentation,
the ominimoda determinatio is always taken for granted and three additional
principles are (implicitly) assumed: that the concept is isomorphic with the
object (the predicates contained in the concept corresponds to properties
that the object has: it is the mirroring theory); that therefore an adequate
23In [KANT 1787, B 627].
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knowledge must be complete (all properties of the object must be considered
in the concept); and finally that one can consider the object ‘in itself’, i.e.
in complete isolation from other objects (it is the assumption of isolation).
Since this is a general arguments which goes beyond to the specific problem
of the existence of God, one can consider the object without relationship with
the other objects of the universe. It is true that in [KANT 1787, B 599–602]
one speaks of the omnimoda determinatio as an ideal, but in the above proof
it is taken as an ontological fact.
To my knowledge Kant never rejected the continuity and perhaps he had
nothing against linearity. He surely assumed a form of materialism: Since
our knowledge can only happen in an experience which is intrinsic spatio–
temporal [KANT 1787, B 33–73], then the objects of knowledge can only be
bodies; and in fact Kant discusses the problem of matter [KANT 1787, B
230, 277–78] and excludes that the subject of knowledge can also be object
of knowledge [KANT 1787, B 152–165]. Of all above postulates only sep-
arability remains; but, as already said, it has been the object of scientific
analysis only in the 1930s.
Then let us also briefly discuss the assumptions (but not the details of the
argumentation) of the article of Einstein and co–workers [EINSTEIN et al. 1935].
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There is no doubt that it acknowledges the omnimoda determinatio. In fact
the aim of the article is to show that there can be elements of the reality which
cannot be represented in quantum mechanics due to its ‘uncertain’ character
(uncertainty principle) — in fact, as it is well known, Einstein thought that
quantum mechanics could only represent a statistical (and therefore incom-
plete) theory of microentities. Specifically, the aim of the article is to show
that quantum mechanics violates a sufficient condition of reality, which may
be expressed as follows: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can
predict with probability equal to unity the value of a physical quantity, then
there exists an element of the physical reality corresponding to this physical
quantity. It is evident that two things are supposed here: first that the reality
is perfectly determined in itself; second, that one can also know it perfectly
(our completeness condition). Continuity is evidently acknowledged in the
formal development of the argument. So there is no doubt that the article
also acknowledged determinism (= omnimoda determinatio + continuity).
Though no word is said about materialism and linearity, the core of the ar-
ticle is represented by a strong defense of the principle of separability (here
for the first time formulated), so that one can suppose that reductionism too
was a valid assumption for Einstein and co–workers.
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But the article goes even further. In fact two definitions are formulated
with great emphasis at the beginning: That of correctness and that of com-
pleteness. It is said that a theory is totally correct if every element of the
theory has a counterpart in reality: In other words a totally correct theory
is one without superfluous theoretical terms. It is evident that the neces-
sary condition for assuming this definition is the mirroring theory: If theo-
ries could not mirror reality, could also not mirror reality correctly. About
completeness it is said that a theory is complete if every element of reality
has a counterpart in it — it is evident that correctness together with com-
pleteness establish an equivalence relationship between physical theory and
reality. This definition of the completeness of a theory is much stronger than
that previously formulated. In conclusion CM and classical gnoseology, and
therefore classical philosophy as such, are defended in Einstein’s article.
It is very interesting that Kant and Einstein — both scientists and philoso-
phers — defend essentially the body of classical philosophy, and that the
latter does it in open conflict with quantum mechanics.
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9 Conclusions
Summing up, CM can be schematically represented as in the figure.
CM has been for three centuries the model of what Science is and should
be. Then it is a little surprising that its basic assumptions were assumed
without critical examination. But two points are here very important:
i) Without quantum mechanics and its consequences nobody would have
perceived the problems hidden in assumptions which ultimately stem
from the common sense or from a refinement of the ordinary experience
about macroscopic objects. This does not mean at all that this expe-
rience is in itself wrong. We live and act in a macroscopic world where
the struggle for life is the most important thing, and for this practical
purpose it makes no sense — and it is perhaps even dangerous — to
assume, for instance, that objects are partly not perfectly determined
or fuzzy24
ii) But neither CM’s assumptions are wrong as such. CM has been in fact
24And, with high probability, also macroscopic objects are partly fuzzy; in fact one has
shown theoretically and finally experimentally that, at mesoscopic level, ‘Schro¨dinger cats’
are possible [MONROE et al. 1996] [BRUNE et al. 1996].
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of the basic postulates and principles of CM.
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a powerful tool in order to explore Nature and establish some basic
features of the physical world. Stated in other terms, for all that one
knew at that time, CM worked — and still works — very well. What
is wrong is only the supposition that CM’s assumptions and laws are
objective in the sense that they mirror what Nature is in itself. In other
words, what was and is wrong about CM is a ‘mirroring’ gnoseology and
epistemology which has produced an absolutisation of the this physical
theory. In other words, we have here a confirmation e contrario of the
rightness of the point of view of pragmatism.
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